MAIB Safety Digest 2005 — Fishing edition

MAIB Digest 2005c 9/5/05 8:26 pm Page b

Fishing 2005 Safety Digest

MAIB Digest 2005c 9/5/05 8:26 pm Page d

The Marine Accident Investigation Branch is an independent part of the Department for Transport, (DfT) and is completely separate from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). The Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents is responsible to the Secretary of State for Transport. The offices of the Branch are located at Carlton House, Carlton Place, Southampton, SO15 2DZ. This Safety Digest draws the attention of the marine community to some of the lessons arising from investigations into recent accidents. This information is published to inform the fishing industry and the public of the general circumstances of marine accidents and to draw out the lessons to be learned. The sole purpose of the Safety Digest is to prevent similar accidents happening again. The content must necessarily be regarded as tentative and subject to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available. The articles do not assign fault or blame nor do they determine liability. The lessons often extend beyond the events of the incidents themselves to ensure the maximum value can be achieved. Extracts can be published without specific permission providing the source is duly acknowledged. The Safety Digest can be obtained by applying to the MAIB. Other publications are also available from the MAIB.

If you wish to report an accident please call our 24 hour reporting line 023 8023 2527.

The telephone number for general use is 023 8039 5500.

The Branch fax number is 023 8023 2459.

The e-mail address is maib@dft.gsi.gov.uk

Safety Digests are available on the Internet: www.maib.gov.uk

Extract from

The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation)

Regulations 2005 The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these regulations is to determine its circumstances and the cause with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to apportion liability, nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to apportion blame.

Chief Inspector’s Foreword 4

1 Modifications Result in Loss of Stability,

Vessel and a Life 6

2 Overloaded, Overdue, Over….. 8

3 Too Much On Top 10

4 Quick Action Saves Fishing Boat and Crew 11

5 Winch Problem Leads to Capsize 12

6 'Dodgy' Alarm, So No Warning 14

7 A Fatal Override 15

8 I See No Ships! 16

9 Fishing Vessel Flooding and Foundering 18

10 Bilge Alarms, Bulkheads and Televisions 19

11 Anchored Bulk Carrier Sinks Fishing Vessel 20

12 The Price of Coronation Street 22

13 Seacocks – So Important 23

14 One Skipper's Relief Causes Stress

to Another 24 15 Are You Alone? 25

16 Deckhand Dragged Overboard and

Lost While Shooting Creels 26

17 Own Goal 27

18 Another Unchecked Flooding 28

19 Fire on Unmanned Crabber 29

20 Down the Fish Room 30

21 Flooding – A Positive Outcome 32

22 Fire-Fighting Training Saves the Day 33

Contents Fishing Vessel Accident Statistics 34

Major Accident Locations Chart 36

MAIB Published Reports 39

Glossary 38

MAIB Report Request Form 39

Chief Inspector’s Again in 2004, 10 UK fishermen died in needless accidents at sea. This brings the total to nearly 300 deaths in 15 years...

Foreword Sadly, flooding/foundering and stability still 2. LIFEJACKETS. Get lifejackets that you head the list of causes. Regularly tested can wear routinely on deck. bilge alarms, and working pumps and Seafish/RNLI can help you identify seacocks will virtually eliminate the flooding/ appropriate types. At the very least, if foundering losses. Getting a vessel checked you won't wear a lifejacket, make sure it for stability by an expert before buying it, is available on deck for an emergency. and getting all structural changes approved A small container on the wheelhouse before carrying them out, will largely solve roof is a good place. In an emergency, the stability related deaths. you will not be able to go down below to find your lifejacket. But you also need to consider your lifesaving equipment. In fishing vessels, 3. EPIRB. EPRIBs may be expensive - catastrophes normally occur very rapidly, although prices have come down - but certainly too rapidly for orderly they are the only means to ensure that preparations to be made to abandon the help is on the way when you have an vessel. In these cases, three things make accident. It is a sensible investment for the difference between life and death: the future for you and your family.

1. AN IN-DATE LIFERAFT, properly Think about the worst, prepare for it, and secured and easily accessible. Lashing you dramatically improve your chances of down your liferaft may be the easy way coming home safely. to stop it being lost, but it could cost you your life in an emergency. Good fishing.

Modifications res of stability, vesse Narrative A 10-metre vessel was single- During the tow, the skipper The inclining experiment, and handedly trawling for prawns. It was established radio contact with the its subsequent analysis, indicated dark, and the weather was fine and coastguard, but communications that her inherent stability had been clear with light winds. were suddenly lost. A search for the poor. The vessel had been modified While hauling, it became missing vessel was initiated. extensively: the gunwale had been apparent that a heavy object had The vessel was subsequently raised and a shelter and net drum entered the net. The skipper tried to found on the seabed. The skipper’s had been fitted, all of which clear it by hauling on the dog rope, body was recovered from the reduced her inherent stability. The but this parted under load. He then wheelhouse, and the vessel was result was that it would have taken wound as much of the net as he later raised and inclined to establish little to capsize her so suddenly that could on to the net drum and her stability at the time of her loss. the skipper did not even have a started to tow the heavy object The heavy object was found to be a chance to get out of the towards port, where he intended to large rock. wheelhouse. get help to remove it.

The Lessons

1 Without a stability standard, adequate stability awareness, and knowledge of the loading limits of their particular vessel, skippers of fishing vessels 2 The Code of Practice for the Safety of Small Fishing Vessels does not stipulate any stability requirements for fishing vessels under 15 metres in under 15 metres in length are severely hampered in their length. However, it does require the fitting of a bilge ability to judge when it is safe to lift, tow or carry heavy alarm, which provides early warning of flooding, and loads. ensures those on board have time to react. This vessel did not have a bilge alarm. Therefore, her skipper would Knowledge of a vessel’s stability and her loading limits is, not have been automatically alerted to any ingress of therefore, an essential control measure aimed at water which would have affected the vessel’s freeboard reducing the risk of capsize. To this end, skippers should and stability. take advantage of the one-day safety awareness course offered by Seafish, and seek professional advice, particularly following any significant modifications.

esult in loss

sel and a life

Overloaded, overdue,

The Lessons

1 Most vessels are modified over the course of their time in service so that they keep pace with technology, are more efficient and comfortable, or as a result of a change in the type of fishing conducted. Consequently, some vessels have ‘grown’ considerably since build. However, any structural modifications have the potential to adversely affect a vessel’s stability, which might not be obvious. So before making any significant alterations, such as adding a winch, extending a wheelhouse, fitting a deck and freeing ports, and adjusting ballast, it is always wise to seek the advice of a qualified person.

over…..

Narrative A 6.5m creel boat failed to return to port as planned. A search began, and she was found partly submerged several hours later. The vessel was recovered, but there was no sign of her crew of two. It was concluded that the vessel was lost because of poor stability caused by material alterations, overloading and water ingress. During the creel boat’s 25 years in service, substantial

2 2 modifications had been made to her. In particular: the raising of gunwales, the fitting of a deck (which was not watertight), enlargement of the wheelhouse, the addition of an hydraulic pot- hauler and the fitting of ballast. All would have significantly changed her stability characteristics. The insertion of freeing ports above a non-watertight deck would also have increased the probability of

The overloading of small fishing vessels is an ever-present danger, and almost total reliance is placed on skippers’ experience and knowledge of their boats to guard against it. However, after a change of ownership, in most cases a new skipper will not be familiar with how a vessel handles. It is therefore 3 In a decked vessel, the easiest way to ensure that an accumulation of water in the bilge does not pass unnoticed, is to fit a high level alarm. Physical checks of the bilge can tend to fall towards the bottom of the priority list when fishing, and even when automatic bilge pumps are working, they might mask, or not cope with, a serious ingress. water accumulating in the bilge. The vessel had recently changed ownership, and the previous operator’s maximum load on deck was sixty creels. At the time of her loss, she was carrying ninety. The vessel was not fitted with a bilge alarm, and her electrical bilge pump was defective. Lifejackets were found in the vessel, but a liferaft was not carried.

important, when buying a second-hand boat, that its

4 maximum loading and limiting conditions be included There will not always be time to grab and don a among the information passed on from its previous lifejacket when things go pear-shaped. Think operators. Without this, a skipper’s assessment is reliant about wearing them at all times when on deck, on trial and error. Unfortunately, some crews don’t get a particularly when conditions are marginal. second chance when such assessments are misjudged.

5 Just because a vessel is not required to carry a liferaft, does not mean that her crew will never need one. If there is room to carry one, do so. It’s not the regulators’ lives which are at risk.

Riddle

Too much on top Pump

3 Narrative The owner/skipper of a 10-metre On this occasion, the skipper steel fishing vessel operated her for agreed that a third person could Diesel-driven pump several years as a prawn trawler. join him for a day. The day went He then decided to convert her to well, with a substantial catch of cockle dredging for operations in cockles. These were stowed in local rivers and a large estuary. large bags, each holding an For this conversion, he estimated one tonne. Two bags removed the trawl winch and fitted were stowed in the fish hold, three a large diesel-driven water pump, a on deck and one on the fish hatch suction pump, a powered riddle and forward of the wheelhouse. an ‘A’ frame for handling the gear. The skipper decided this was The two pumps were mounted on their limit, and hauled the dredging amiss, and managed to jump into deck, and the riddle on the port gear on board. The boat was in a the water before the boat bulwark. These three items were of narrow part of a river, and the completely capsized. substantial weight. Some extra skipper needed to turn her, to return Fortunately, all three men ballast was added in an effort to to their landing quay. As he managed to kick off their boots etc compensate for this topweight. knocked the boat out of gear, to and swim to the shore. One The vessel was operated with begin a three-point turn in the managed to walk to a nearby few problems for a couple of narrow river, the boat began to heel house, where the emergency months by the skipper to port. This heeling continued. The services were called. None suffered and one crewman. three men realised something was any serious injury.

The Lessons

1 The weight of cockle bags on deck was substantial for a boat of this size. This topweight, coupled with the unknown effects of the modifications made to the boat, generated a condition where she had no reserves of stability. For boats of this size, which are not required to comply with any formal stability standards, it is vital that owners and skippers take great care when modifying and loading them, so that they retain some reserve of stability.

2 Fortunately, all three men were able to make their way to the bank of the river. In less friendly conditions they might have been less fortunate. Permanent wear buoyancy, that is comfortable to wear while working, can provide vital support in such circumstances. All fishermen should consider wearing such aids. 10 Diesel-driven pump A-frame

Quick action saves fishing boat and

4 Narrative The skipper of a 22-metre fishing vessel was reading in his bunk at

crew about 2130, when he noticed a strong smell of burning plastic. He Having told the crew that there quickly left his cabin and checked was a fire in the galley, he called the engine room. Although the the coastguard on Channel 16. The engine room was clear of smoke, coastguard put out a “Mayday” there was a light smoky haze in the distress call. accommodation. The smoke by that time was The fire was brought under On carefully opening the galley very heavy, and the cook shut the control, and the fishing vessel was door, the skipper saw that the area hatch down from the wheelhouse able to return to port under her own was full of smoke. He shut the door and checked that the entry to the power, having first evacuated three immediately, and raised the alarm by forward shelter was shut. of the five crew members as a shouting for all the crew to get up and An offshore stand-by vessel in precaution. bring their lifejackets to the bridge. He the vicinity reacted to the “Mayday” Investigation showed that the told the cook to shut off the power to and sent its fast rescue boat to the fire had been started by a survival the cooker, and then went up to the fishing boat, with 4 lifejackets and a suit coming into contact with a wheelhouse. Once there, he again breathing apparatus set. The stand- ‘black heater’ in the drying room raised the alarm over the tannoy, and by vessel then came in close, and when the vessel had started rolling, was met on the bridge by the rest of trained its fire monitors on to the about 30 minutes before the fire the crew. Not all had brought their hotspot on the lower was noticed. This spread through a lifejackets. accommodation. bulkhead to the galley area.

The Lessons This incident shows how a difficult situation can be brought under control by clear thinking and quick action.

1 By opening the galley door carefully, and only a little, the skipper prevented the fire from spreading, and ensured his own safety. 3 Ensuring that all available hatches and openings were closed, contained the fire long enough for it to be brought under control.

2 Immediately raising the alarm and instructing all the crew to muster on the bridge allowed further action to be taken once all the crew were accounted for. 4 The unguarded ‘black heater’ has since been fitted with a guard six inches all around it, and the bulkhead to the galley has been replaced by a steel one. Think about where you dry wet clothing.

Winch problem leads to capsize

5Narrative A large vessel was fishing to the west of Scotland. The wind was north-west force 3, there was a heavy swell, the visibility was moderate to poor in rain, and it was dark. A crew of six was on board. In the late evening, the port fishing gear became snagged on an underwater obstruction. While trying to pull it free, the winches stopped. This effectively anchored the vessel to the seabed in the heavy swell, which caused her to take a large list to port. Because she was rolling either side of the port list, the port engine intakes went below the waterline. This, in turn, caused the engine room to flood. Between 5 and 10 minutes later, the vessel capsized to port. After the winches stopped, all six hydraulic pumps that powered them were restarted, but before the load could be taken off the port winch, the system failed again. The computer-controlled winch system on the vessel was very complex. It has not been possible to identify clearly the reason why the winches stopped. However, had the emergency start been used, it is possible that the load on the port winch could have been released. Also, it was not necessary to re- start all six hydraulic pumps. Starting one of them that supplied the port winch might have been sufficient to release the load. However, there was very little time to consider the options, because the capsize and foundering were very rapid. The brakes were set up so that they came on automatically when the winches stopped. The winch

Winch control panel

control system could have been higher up and/or further inboard to EPIRB saved the day; the configured so that the brakes avoid the risk of downflooding. coastguard were able to pinpoint stayed off. Had the safety brake Events happened so quickly the accident, and immediately been enabled, and worked as that the crew did not have time to dispatched a helicopter which intended, it might have saved the radio for help before they rescued the survivors. vessel. abandoned their vessel. Five