Calendar Year 1991-1994

Contents Abbreviations, iii

Introduction, 1

Gulf of Mexico OCS Region Blowouts, 4 Explosions or Fires, 9 Pipeline Breaks or Leaks, 40 Significant Pollution Incidents (50 barrels or more), 52 Injuries and Fatalities, 54

Pacific OCS Region Explosions or Fires, 80 Significant Pollution Incidents (50 barrels or more), 90 Injuries and Fatalities, 91

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Abbreviations AC -alternating current AUX -auxiliary bbl -barrel(s) BOP -blowout preventer BPV -back pressure valve CaCL2 -calcium chloride CLH -class H CO2 -carbon dioxide CPR -cardiopulmonary resuscitation d -day(s) DC -direct current EIPS -Eugene Island Pipe Line System ESD -emergency shut down ft -foot (feet) ft3 -cubic feet gal -gallon h -hour HRC -hydraulic remote control H2S -hydrogen sulfide in -inch(es) K -knots LACT -lease automatic custody transfer lb -pound(s) LP -low pressure LSH -level safety high LSL -level safety low MD -measured depth min -minute MV -motor vessel M/V -mobile vessel NA -not applicable or not available as appropriate OCS -Outer Continental Shelf ppg -pounds per gallon ppm -parts per million psi -pounds per square inch psig -pounds per square inch gauge PSH -Pressure Safety high PSV -pressure safety valve PVC -polyvinyl chloride

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ROW -right of way RTU -remote terminal unit s -second(s) SAT -satellite SCR -silicon controlled rectifier SM South Marsh Island SOB -Sohio, Odeco, Burma SP -South Pass SRU -sulphur recovery unit SS -Ship Shoal TD -total depth TSE -temperature safety element (fusible material) TSH -temperature safety high TVD -true vertical depth USCG -U.S. Coast Guard VR -Vermilion

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Introduction

This report updates the previously published Accidents Associated with Oil and Gas Operations Outer Continental Shelf. 1956—1990, OCS Report MMS 92-0058 This report includes accidents that occurred in the time period 1991-1994 The accidents are classified by region and type.

The data source for this publication is the Agency’s accident computer database (OPAC) The OPAC database is populated from reports prepared by the investigators at the time of the accidents.

This report is prepared as a part of the Minerals Management Services effort to make data available to those having a need for such data. The user is reminded mat accidents often occur multidimensional and always multiple causes. For this reason some accident information appears in more than one category within the report. Below are guidelines used in making these classifications:

Blowouts- An uncontrollable flow of fluids from a wellhead or wellbore is classified as a blowout.

Explosions and Fires-- This category includes all explosions and fires directly related to drilling, producing, storing, or transporting oil or gas on or from Outer Continental Shelf leases All explosions and fires are recorded

Pipeline Breaks or Leaks—This category includes all reported pipeline breaks or leaks

Significant Pollution Incidents- - All spills in the amount of 50 barrels (2100 gallons) or more are included

Injuries and Fatalities- All Fatalities or serious personal injuries that cause permanent impairment of any body unit or function are classified as major accidents. This report includes major and minor injuries

Gulf of Mexico Region

BLOWOUTS Block Type Facility Water Depth (ft) Well Type Injuries Lease No. Weather Primary Cause Equipment Involved Spills (bbl) Structure Activity at Accident Operator Type Spill Brazos 91-05-08 Blowout Drilling 0 Block 0577 Jackup 116 Exploratory 0 G 12468 Clear, Wind 5/SE Influx of Fluid into Wellbore 0.0 Structure No 1 Exploratory Drilling King Ranch Oil and Gas Inc

Remarks: After the crew nippled up the BOP stack to continue drilling after cementing the 10 3/4—inch surface casing, gas began channeling through the lead cement in the 10 3/4-inch by 16-inch annulus as the cement developed its compressive strength. The gas apparently continued to develop wide, productive channels in the cement sheath.

Main Pass 91-06-04 Blowout Drilling 0 Block 01299 Plalform Rig 210 Development 0 G09372 Good 0.0 Structure BW Pulling out of hole Freeport McMoran Resource Ptnr

Remarks: Freeport-Sulphur reported that the 24-inch drive pipe was set to 150 feet below mud line. The well was drilled to 1000 feet with 12 1/4-inch bit, taking returns through a 6-inch manual valve at the +20-foot level due to lost circulation problems. At 6:10 am., while pulling out of the hole at +858 feet, the well came in. The annular preventer was closed around the 4 1/2-inch drill pipe and the diverter system lines (12-inch) were both opened. The upwind line valve vas closed, and the pumping of seawater down the drill pipe began. The valve at the +20-foot level was open. The pipe rains were closed. At 7:15 am., the two mud pumps continued to pump seawater down the drill pipe as the platform was abandoned via escape capsules. From 11 am to 3 p.m., the well bridged over and flowed intermittently. At 3:30 pm, the crew returned to the platform. Subsequently, cement was pumped into the open hole (with no returns) and a packer was set in the drive pipe to secure the well.

BLOWOUTS Block Type Facility Water Depth (ft) Well Type Injuries Lease No. Weather Primary Cause Equipment Involved Spills (bbl) Structure Activity at Accident Operator Type Spill Green Canyon 91-08-25 Blowout Drilling 0 Block 0006 Steel Tower 622 Development 0 G06987 Partly Cloudy Shallow Gas 0.0 Structure A Circulating/Tripping Texaco Exp and Prod

Remarks: While the crew was attempting to sidetrack Well A-1, a window was milled in the 16-inch conductor and cement was set. The 13 3/8-inch shoe was tested to equivalent mud weight. The crew began pulling the first pipe stand out of the hole at 1.30 pm on August 25, 1991. At 2:30 pm, the annulus started bubbling and mud rolled over the drill floor. The annular preventer was closed, production was shut in, and all nonessential personnel were evacuated to standby boat. Well flow was diverted while pumping continued w 10.5 ppg mud at 16 bbl per minute. The well was monitored from 10:00 p.m. on August 25, 1991 to 8 :00 am on August 26, 1991. A noise and temperature log as run with no indication of underground flow. The annulus was open at 3:00 pm with no flow Attempts to pull the pipe failed. The pipe was stuck at 1512 feet, 30 feet inside the 13 3/8-inch shoe. Texaco decided to abandon the well at this time A possible cause was time balling of the bit or stabilizers with mud, which pulled formations fluids into the well. After the crew went back into the hole and circulated it, the bubble expanded reducing hydrostatic head and causing more fluids to enter the well.

Vermilion 91-10-28 Blowout Drilling 0 Block 0191 96 0 G0l134 0.0 Structure Soil Boring Taylor Energy Co

Remarks: Taylor Energy Company reported a minor blowout on October 28, 1991 The rig was jacked up on location to take soil boring utilizing a 2-inch-diameter coil barrel. The rig took soil boring to a depth of 252-feet below mud line. After pulling one joint of drill pipe out of hole, gas bubbles increased, blowing water 5 to 15 feet high. The rig was shut down amid all personnel evacuated by boat from the rig. The flow stopped when the gas zone was depleted.

BLOWOUTS Block Type Facility Water Depth (ft) Well Type Injuries Lease No. Weather Primary Cause Equipment Involved Spills (bbl) Structure Activity at Accident Operator Type Spill East Cameron 91-11-11 Blowout Drilling 0 Block 0167 Jackup 80 Exploratory 0 G09451 Insufficient Density of 0.8 Structure Drilling Fluid Drilling Zilkha Energy Co.

Remarks: As the objective sand was drilled into, the well started to flow. The well was shut in immediately resulting in pressure on the drill pipe and casing. Pressure suddenly dropped and then reappeared across all the casing strings indicating communication. After approximately 24 hours, gas broached around the drive pipe, resulting in the evacuation of nonessential personnel. Casing strings split upon shutting in the well, allowing the release of hydrocarbons and saltwater. The well then bridged over.

Ewing Bank 91-11-13 Blowout Drilling 0 Block 0947 Steel Tower 477 Development 0 G05803 Clear Inadequate Mud Supply 0.0 Structure A Running Casing Delmar Operating Inc.

Remarks: Spudded Well A-9 on November 12, 1991. Drilled a 26-inch hole to 1722 feet with seawater. Spotted a 10 ppg mud before pulling out of the hole to run casing. On November 23, 1991, began running casing. Ran 8 joints of 20-inch 133 lb/fl. X-56 casing to 322 feet when the well began to flow at the +10 level. (There were two valves at 10 feet above the water line to take returns while drilling the conductor hole to prevent loosing returns.) The well was flowing a full stream of mud through both valves at the +10 level. Closed both valves and the fluid level started rising in the 30-inch casing. Open the diverter and closed the annular preventer. Well began diverting mud. Pumped 123 barrels (bbl) of 15.2 ppg mud and 51 bbl of 10 ppg mud. The flow lasted for 10 minutes. The well temporarily lost returns, then the fluid level stabilized between 7 and 10 feet below the annular preventer. Observed the well for 3 hours. The well was stable. Pulled the 20- inch casing out of the hole. Ran in the hole to bottom with a 26-inch bit and washed and reamed through many bridges. Circulated and filled the hole with 10.5 ppg mud and pulled out of the hole. Ran 20-inch casing and cemented with no problems.

BLOWOUTS Block Type Facility Water Depth (ft) Well Type Injuries Lease No. Weather Primary Cause Equipment Involved Spills (bbl) Structure Activity at Accident Operator Type Spill South Pass 92-12 -26 Blowout Drilling 0 Block 0060 Jackup 15 Exploratory 0 G01608 Insufficient Density of Well 100.0 Structure Drilling Fluid Atlantic Richfield Co

Remarks: While the crew was preparing to go back into hole with a core barrel gun assembly, the well percolated gas with the fluid level dropping, reducing the hydrostatic pressure on the formation. The well began flowing natural gas, condensate, and water. Approximately 100 bbl of condensate flowed into the Gulf of Mexico before the diverter could be closed.

Main Pass 93-01-19 Blowout Drilling 0 Block 0299 Semi submersible 210 Exploratory 0 G09372 0.0 Structure No. 21 Freeport McMoran Resource Ptnr

Remarks: A blowout occurred while the crew was drilling Welt No. 21, a relief well for Well No. 11, in Main Pass Block 299. The floating drilling rig Ocean Voyage was being used by Freeport McMoran. After the crew drilled through the U-sand at a depth of 619 feet, a gas boil was observed. The rig was moved oil location while a portable Hydrogen Sulfide detector recorded a reading of 4 ppm hydrogen sulfide. Also, 8% combustible gas was recorded. The boil, the radial extent of which was approximately 300 feet had ceased on January 22, 1993. On January 25, 1993, divers determined the pipe had sheared 25 feet below mud line. The well had bridged over.

BLOWOUTS Block Type Facility Water Depth (ft) Well Type Injuries Lease No. Weather Primary Cause Equipment Involved Spills (bbl) Structure Activity at Accident Operator Type Spill Main Pass 93-02-25 Blowout Drilling 0 Block 0299 Jackup 209 Development 0 G12362 Influx of Fluid into Wellbore 0.0 Structure A -12 Drilling Freeport-McMoran Inc.

Remarks: A hydrogen sulfide blowout occurred while the Charles Rowan No. 36 was drilling Well A-12. The well began unloading cement, gas, saltwater, and mud through the 16-inch by 24-inch annulus 7 hours after the 16-inch casing had been cemented and after the BOP stack had been removed. A hydrogen sulfide reading of 99 ppm csas recorded All nonessential personnel were evacuated and masks were donned. The blowout started at 5:30 p.m. and stopped when the well bridged over.

Lease No. Weather Primary Cause Fuel Source Spills (bbl) Segment No./Structure Ignition Source Operator Fuel Type Green Canyon 91-01-28 Fire Production 0 Block 0065 Steel Tower 101 Generator 0 G05900 Miscellaneous Equipment Fibrous Materials 0.0 Structure A Failure Sparks from Exciter Shell Offshore Inc Air Filter

Remarks: Hearing failure on the exciter for the No. 3 generator caused the exciter to overheat and sparks were emitted. Sparks from the exciter ignited the air filters which were constructed of a fibrous material. The fire was extinguished with carbon dioxide and dry chemicals, but the air filter kept igniting. After all electrical power was disconnected water was sprayed in the air filters and prevented any further ignition. The exciter, air filter housing, and air blower were replaced.

Eugene Island 91-02-06 Fire Production 0 Block 0199 Steel Tower 101 Pump& Compressor 1 00437 Pipeline Pump 0.0 Structure A Engine Exhaust Delmar Operating Inc. Crude

Remarks: The pipeline pump was pumping oil into Shell Offshore Inc‘s pipeline. A gasket on the bottom flange of the pump (PSV) ruptured and started spraying oil. The oil contacted an exposed portion of the prime mover exhaust and ignited. The fire lasted about 10 minutes and was extinguished with dry chemical and fire water. One employee received flash burns to his forehead, but the incident did not result in a lost time accident.

Lease No. Weather Primary Cause Fuel Source Spills (bbl) Segment No./Structure Ignition Source Operator Fuel Type Eugene Island 91-03-23 Explosion Production 0 Block 0099 Steel Tower 25 Fuel Filler 1 00795 Tank Ruptured NA 0.0 Structure 13 Overpressure Total Minatome Corp NA

Remarks: An explosion occurred when the bottom of a fuel filter pot blew out causing serious injuries to one employee. Someone used a gas supply line (jumper) and mistakenly introduced 1100 psi of gas into the fuel filter pot. This caused the vessel to overpressure and it exploded

Eugene Island 91-03-28 Fire Abandonment 0 Block 0053 Steel Tower 20 Skimmer 0 00479 Fire Skimmer 0.0 Structure A Welding Torch Pennzoil Exp and Prod Oil

Remarks: Operations were being conducted to abandon the platform, when piping on the skimmer was cut with a welding torch. The hot slag ignited the oil in the skimmer. The fire was extinguished with water and dry chemicals.

Lease No. Weather Primary Cause Fuel Source Spills (bbl) Segment No./Structure Ignition Source Operator Fuel Type High Island 91-05-01 Fire Production 0 Block 0376 Steel Tower 328 Skim Pile 6 G02754 Partly Cloudy Fire Skim Pile 0.0 Structure A Gouging & Welding Anadarko Petro Corp. Gas

Remarks: It appeared ,that gouging on the cellar deck grating caused a spark which ignited a combustible mixture in the oil section of the skim pile. Si contractor personnel suffered first- and second-degree burns, and one operator employee tore the cartilage in his left knee. Five of the injuries were serious.

High Island 91-05-05 Fire Pipeline Operation 0 Block 0264 Steel Tower Turbine Compressor 0 G09l40 Poor Equipment Design or Vent Points 0.0 Structure Placement Engine Surface High Island Offshore System Lub Oil

Remarks: Small fires ignited in the vicinity of the vent points on the turbine/compressor unit lubricating system. On compressor shutdown, the vent valve for the compressor casing did not open because the control system did not function as intended. As a consequence, the gas trapped in the compressor casing forced small volumes of lubricating oil out at the vent points on the lubricating system, which, upon contact with hot surfaces on the unit, ignited.

Lease No. Weather Primary Cause Fuel Source Spills (bbl) Segment No./Structure Ignition Source Operator Fuel Type Ship Shoal 91-06-03 Fire Production 0 Block 0207 Steel Tower 100 Safely Panel 0 G01523 Clear Safety Panel 0.0 Structure D Hot Slag Placid Oil Co Gas

Remarks: A flash fire occurred while old braces were cut from the platform. Hot slag from the cutting torch fell onto the tarpaulin which was covering Wells D—5, D—7, and the safety panel. The hot slag burned through the tarpaulin and gas from the safety panel ignited. The fire lasted about 10 seconds and was extinguished with a 30-pound dry chemical unit.

Mustang Island 91-06-19 Fire Production 0 Block 0757 Steel Tower 144 Generator 0 G03019 Poor Equipment Design or Generator Vent 0.0 Structure B Placement Exhaust Atlantic Richfield Co. Condensate

Remarks: The unmanned platform was automatically shut down due to a level safety high (LSH) on the fuel gas filter. When the operator personnel arrived to restart the platform, the generator was still running, but it was lugging down. When the No. 1 generator was shut down, the No. 2 generator attempted to start. The increased flow through the fuel gas line caused a slug of fluid through the starter, to the vent. Tue vent was piped to the outside of the building. The gas/condensate was ignited from the hot exhaust of the No. 1 generator that had just been shut down. The fire was immediately extinguished by the operator. Remedial action was to change the logic in order that the generators will not automatically start after a LSH or PSH of the fuel gas system. The vent was rerouted to the vent scrubber.

Lease No. Weather Primary Cause Fuel Source Spills (bbl) Segment No./Structure Ignition Source Operator Fuel Type Eugene Island 91-07-03 Fire Production 0 Block 0129 Steel Tower 52 Culling Torch 1 00054 Clear Employee Negligence Sump Pump PVC Pipe 0.0 Structure CF Cutting Torch Mobil Oil Exp & Production Oil

Remarks: A flash fire occurred during routine removal of corroded platform piping. A contract welder was culling corroded pipe. As he was cutting, the heat caused a portion of the adjacent PVC pipe to melt. The oil inside the PVC piping ignited and sprayed onto the welder. He received minor burns.

West Cameron 91-07-26 Fire Production 0 Block 0543 Steel Tower 185 Torch & Piping 0 G02010 Employee Negligence Piping 0.0 Structure A Cutting Torch Kerr-McGee Corp. Oil

Remarks: A small flash fire occurred when employees were in the process of removing equipment from the platform. While cutting the welds which were holding a production skid to the deck, a welder inadvertently cut through a 2-inch line containing hydrocarbons and water. The fire watch quickly extinguished the fire.

Lease No. Weather Primary Cause Fuel Source Spills (bbl) Segment No./Structure Ignition Source Operator Fuel Type Eugene Island 91-07-29 Fire Production 0 Block0063 Steel Tower 25 Stock Tank 0 00425 Stock