MAIB Safety Digest 2008 — Fishing edition

Fishing 2008 Safety Digest

The Marine Accident Investigation Branch is an independent part of the Department for Transport, (DfT) and is completely separate from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). The Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents is responsible to the Secretary of State for Transport. The offices of the Branch are located at Carlton House, Carlton Place, Southampton, SO15 2DZ. This Safety Digest draws the attention of the marine community to some of the lessons arising from investigations into recent accidents. This information is published to inform the fishing industry and the public of the general circumstances of marine accidents and to draw out the lessons to be learned. The sole purpose of the Safety Digest is to prevent similar accidents happening again. The content must necessarily be regarded as tentative and subject to alteration if additional evidence becomes available. The articles do not assign fault or blame nor do they determine liability. The lessons often extend beyond the events of the incidents themselves to ensure the maximum value can be achieved. Extracts can be published without specific permission providing the source is duly acknowledged. The Safety Digest is only available from the Department for Transport, and can be obtained by applying to the MAIB. Other publications are available from the MAIB.

If you wish to report an accident please call our 24 hour reporting line: 023 8023 2527

The telephone number for general use is 023 8039 5500

The Branch fax number is 023 8023 2459

The e-mail address is maib@dft.gsi.gov.uk

Safety Digests are available on the Internet: www.maib.gov.uk

The role of the MAIB is to contribute to safety at sea by determining the causes and circumstances of accidents, and working with others to reduce the likelihood of such causes and circumstances recurring in the future.

Extract from:

The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation)

Regulations 2005 The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these regulations is to determine its circumstances and the cause with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to apportion liability, nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to apportion blame.

Contents Chief Inspector's Foreword 4

1 Smoking Kills! 6

2 Assumptions (Based on Scanty Information)

Lead to Collision 8

3 Fire at Sea – Be Prepared, Be Trained –

It could Be You Next 10

4 “Invited Back On Board” 12

5 Crush Stop! 14

6 Better to be Safe Than Sorry 16

7 A Rude Awakening 18

8 Poor Beam Trawler Practice Costs Three Lives 20

9 Too Much Up Top! 22

10 In Drink and in the Drink 24

11 Not Dressed for the Job 25

12 Shrimp Boiler Lights up the Engine Room 26

13 Spot the Difference 28

14 Trim for Safety, Not for Catching Fish 30

15 Two Sides of the Same Coin 32

Fishing Vessel Accident Statistics 34

Major Accident Locations Chart 36

MAIB Published Reports 37

Glossary 38

MAIB Report Request Form 39

Chief Inspector’s F Fishing is, by a large margin, t

Everyone knows that fishing is a dangerous industry – statistically it is the most dangerous industry in the UK. And the dangers lurk across most areas of fishing.

After a year of below average numbers for fishing vessel accidents, injuries and fatalities (316 accidents, 57 injuries and 10 deaths in 2007) there were three major accidents involving large “Anglo- Spanish” fishing vessels in the first few weeks of 2008.

Regardless of the size or type of vessel you work in, it is only by constant vigilance that you can keep yourself and your fellow crewmen safe.

The cases in this Safety Digest cover a wide range of accidents. I would ask fishermen to read all of the cases, and to think about whether something similar could happen to you or your boat.

By thinking about the hazards, you can avoid them.

Safe fishing.

Foreword the most dangerous profession in the UK.

Smoking Kills! Narrative

After a short trip fishing for scallops, an under 10m fishing vessel returned to port around midday and moored outboard of another fishing vessel in port. The skipper and crewman spent some time sorting out the boat before going to a local pub. In the early evening, the skipper left the crewman at the pub and went home to prepare for his evening job, working at a night club. During the evening, the crewman continued drinking, and at 0200 went to the club where the skipper was working. Both men were given a lift from the club at about 0430; the skipper went home, and the crewman returned to the fishing vessel as his usual shore accommodation was unavailable. The crewman managed to climb down the quayside ladder and cross the boat alongside to his own fishing vessel where, using a spare key hidden on the boat, he entered the wheelhouse. He did not turn on any lights, leaving the vessel’s main batteries isolated, but picked up the wheelhouse ashtray and descended into the small accommodation space in the dark. There, he partially undressed and sat on one of the bunks to smoke a cigarette. As he smoked, the crewman either fell asleep or became unconscious, and his cigarette started a smouldering fire which burnt a small amount of the bunk’s foam mattress and woodwork (see photograph). The crewman died without regaining consciousness as the fire consumed the oxygen in the space and gave off toxic fumes. The owner boarded the fishing vessel later that morning, and smelt smoke as he opened the wheelhouse door. Taking the wheelhouse fire extinguisher, he first checked the engine room for fire before returning to the wheelhouse and entering the accommodation space. He found the crewman in the smoke-filled accommodation space. There were no flames, the fire having burnt itself out during the night.

The Lessons

1 Neither the owner nor the skipper permitted smoking in the accommodation space, for 2 A smoke alarm might well have prevented this tragic accident. A simple domestic fire 3 Where possible, use non- combustible materials on board your vessel, or materials good reason. However, perhaps alarm costs very little and merely which are resistant to ignition. They due to the influence of alcohol, the requires a new battery periodically. will reduce the chances of a fire crewman forgot this policy and paid Fitting a smoke alarm is easy, and starting, or, if one does start, will the ultimate price. it may well save you or your crew’s help prevent it spreading quickly. life. It is intended that a smoke alarm will be required on all decked vessels covered by the revised Small Fishing Vessel Code to be issued in the future.

Assumptions (Based on Scanty Narrative On a dark night, with good visibility, collision. Meanwhile, on the tug, the initially lost as the batteries had an 11 metre GRP fishing vessel bearing of the fishing vessel was shifted. However, the skipper was trawling when its skipper saw observed to be opening to port and reacted very well to the situation; another vessel’s lights, two white an assumption was made that no he checked the compartments for and both sidelights, fine on the port risk of collision existed. water ingress, using a torch bow a few miles away. The skipper The skipper of the fishing strategically positioned for such assumed this to be a power driven vessel next sighted the other vessel emergency situations, and then vessel, greater than 50 metres in as it came abeam on the port side. rigged an emergency supply length, and decided that, although When he saw its working deck connector and restored some a risk of collision existed, he would illuminated with a floodlight, he electrical power. stand-on as there were realised, for the first time, that it The vessel remained obstructions/wrecks on the sea bed was a tug and that it could be seaworthy, despite damage to its on his starboard side. towing something! starboard bow (see photograph). On the other vessel, the The skipper altered course by The skipper called the coastguard watchkeeper observed the fishing 10 degrees to starboard before by mobile phone, as power was not vessel, visually, at about the same altering back to port, as he did not initially restored to the VHF; he time, fine to port showing trawling wish to pull his trawl gear too far off calmly reported his position, that he lights and a red sidelight. However, track. Shortly after this the skipper had just been in collision with the vessel was, in fact, a 26 metre noticed the vessel’s speed reducing something he had not seen, and tug towing a 50 metre long, 18 and instinctively put the engine that he could see a tug steaming metre wide barge on which the astern. The vessel was then away from the scene. The navigation lights had recently failed. pushed across, first to port and coastguard then called out the local Both vessels had radar; then to starboard, just before the lifeboat to escort the fishing vessel, although neither had ARPA vessel started to list heavily to port under its own power, back to its facilities, no plots were made. to an angle of 30 degrees. The home port. With a strong wind (force 6) on skipper reports that the port The coastguard then called the its starboard bow the tug, which gunwale was under the water and tug, who responded immediately was making some 4 knots into a that water reached the level of the and stated that they had assumed strong tide, had its barge displaced fish hatch. the fishing vessel had passed on its port quarter; the length of tow At no time did the skipper see safely, albeit closely, down the side was just less than 200 metres. the barge with which his vessel had of the tow. Another vessel in the As the vessels drew closer, the undoubtedly collided. The fishing area, monitoring this conversation, skipper of the fishing vessel, which vessel, probably now trapped under volunteered to stand-by the fishing was making about 3 knots, lost the port “bow” of the barge, began vessel until the lifeboat arrived. sight of the other vessel’s green to make sternway and then came The tug was then allowed to sidelight and assumed that it had free of the barge and returned to resume its voyage. altered course to starboard to avoid the upright. Electrical power was

Information) Lead to Collision

Photographs showing bow damage

The Lessons

1 The assessment of risk of collision on both vessels was poor as both made assumptions based on scanty information. The International 4 The tug could have elected to show the lights and shapes for a vessel “restricted in her ability to manoeuvre” as the size of the barge and adverse Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Rule 7, weather conditions did restrict the tug’s ability to deviate identifies the correct way to assess risk of collision. If readily from its course [Rule 3 (g) refers]. The display of both vessels had complied with this Rule the accident these lights would have facilitated a more thorough could have been avoided. assessment of the situation by the fishing vessel by alerting it to the fact that this was not a normal power

2 The lookouts kept by both vessels failed to enable a full appraisal of the situation and of the driven vessel as the skipper assumed.

risk of collision, (Rule 5). It is important to ensure that as much information as possible is gathered from the lookout, in this case had both vessels scrutinised each 5 The skipper of the fishing vessel reacted well to a potentially dangerous situation. The fact that he knew the location of his emergency torch and then other with binoculars, they might have realised that their quickly restored electrical power to his vessel, shows the initial assumptions were not reliable and that an earlier value of being prepared and becoming very familiar with alteration of course was required by both vessels. what to do in an emergency on your vessel.

3 The tug could and should have warned local shipping via a “Securité” VHF broadcast when the navigation lights on the tow failed. Vessels should 6 The master of the vessel which volunteered to stand-by the damaged fishing vessel demonstrated the best traditions of good seamanship. consider the use of such broadcasts if they have information which could be of significance to other vessels in their immediate vicinity. 9

Fire at Sea – Be Prepared, Be Trained – It Could Be You Next

Narrative

Two fishing vessels from the same wheelhouse before abandoning port caught fire while at sea within ship. He was then able to make a a few weeks of one another. One “Mayday” call from the liferaft, vessel burnt out and sank; the which had been quickly and other’s wheelhouse and mess room efficiently released from the were destroyed. wheelhouse top by the crew, who Fortunately, in both accidents, were familiar with the procedures the crews were able to abandon required. ship into a liferaft and were later On the other vessel, the spread rescued unharmed. The survivors of the fire was even quicker, and of both accidents all remarked on the skipper did well to broadcast a the extremely fast spread of the “Mayday” call from the wheelhouse fires and that they only had time to before assisting the crew (who save themselves by abandoning were all asleep when he called ship. That there were no fatalities them from the cabin) in launching from either accident, can be the liferaft. partially attributed to the fact that One fire probably started in the both of the skippers had attended galley/cooker area; the other might sea survival and fire-fighting have been caused by an electric training courses, and were able to cabling fault. In both cases, react very well in the short time however, the speed of fire spread available to them when disaster and the damage incurred means struck. that the exact causes will probably On one vessel, the skipper had never be known. the presence of mind to grab a portable VHF set from the burning

The Lessons

1 Ensure that everyone on board has attended the requisite statutory training courses in fire-fighting, sea survival and first-aid. These accidents, and the fact 3 The galley stove provides an obvious source of ignition. Ensure that this is only for heating up food and drink – and not the boat! that no lives were lost, demonstrate the importance of fishermen attending these courses. 4 The insulation of electrical wiring should be checked at regular intervals. It is almost

2 Ensure that everyone on board is very familiar with the emergency equipment carried: both location and use. Both these skippers had ensured that impossible to visually inspect wiring on board any vessel, and the only way to ensure it is in good condition is to have it tested by a professional. It is worth the cost! their crews knew where the safety gear was and how to use it.

“Invited Back on Board” Narrative

In the early hours of the morning ventilation openings on the upper emergency power supply, but could while on watch in the wheelhouse, deck and tried to operate the not isolate the main batteries. The the skipper of a 20m wooden emergency fuel shut off valves. crew put on lifejackets and fishing trawler smelled smoke One worked, but the other was very immersion suits, and then launched coming up through the engine room stiff and did not shut correctly. The the liferaft. Before climbing down to control panel. The engine room skipper tried the main engine stop the liferaft, the skipper and mate smoke alarm activated, but the boat button, but this did not work either, attempted to rig a towing bridle was towing hard against the tide so he reduced engine speed and forward, but were prevented by and the skipper thought it likely to engaged the hydraulics to try and dense smoke escaping from the be caused by heat and exhaust stall the engine. The engine kept shelter deck through a missing from the turbocharger. A few running and was finally stalled by hatch cover. minutes later, the smell grew fouling the propeller with a rope The crew abandoned the stronger and the skipper called the thrown over the stern. With the burning fishing vessel safely, using mate from the shelter deck to engine stopped, the mate operated the liferaft to transfer to a nearby investigate. The mate went below the CO2 drench system. fishing vessel which had responded and, shortly after, the skipper Smoke now filled the to the “Mayday”. Despite their decided to follow him. wheelhouse, having risen through ordeal, the crew were all safe and The mate went into the engine unsealed conduits and wiring looms well. Soon afterwards, an offshore room and saw an orange glow near between the engine room and supply vessel arrived on scene and the deck, in the area of the main wheelhouse control panel. The began to fight the fire with a batteries. He and the skipper set off skipper had to stand outside and powerful foam monitor. two fire extinguishers, but were use the radio through an open As daylight approached, the beaten back by thick smoke. They window to send a “Mayday” signal. smoke appeared to have died closed down the engine room The mate switched over to the down, and the master of the supply

vessel suggested to the skipper smoke had almost gone. The The skipper and mate evacuated to that he return to his boat to see if skipper agreed, and he and the the upper deck and managed to rig the fire was out and to check for mate went across in the FRC, still a tow as the fire escalated. The damage. Only a few hours had wearing their immersion suits and fishing gear