MAIB Safety Digest 2006 — Fishing edition

MAIB Digest 2006 b 15/6/06 21:12 Page c

Fishing 2006 Safety Digest

MAIB Digest 2006 b 15/6/06 21:12 Page d

The Marine Accident Investigation Branch is an independent part of the Department for Transport, (DfT) and is completely separate from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). The Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents is responsible to the Secretary of State for Transport. The offices of the Branch are located at Carlton House, Carlton Place, Southampton, SO15 2DZ. This Safety Digest draws the attention of the marine community to some of the lessons arising from investigations into recent accidents. This information is published to inform the fishing industry and the public of the general circumstances of marine accidents and to draw out the lessons to be learned. The sole purpose of the Safety Digest is to prevent similar accidents happening again. The content must necessarily be regarded as tentative and subject to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available. The articles do not assign fault or blame nor do they determine liability. The lessons often extend beyond the events of the incidents themselves to ensure the maximum value can be achieved. Extracts can be published without specific permission providing the source is duly acknowledged. The Safety Digest can be obtained by applying to the MAIB. Other publications are also available from the MAIB.

If you wish to report an accident please call our 24 hour reporting line 023 8023 2527

The telephone number for general use is 023 8039 5500

The Branch fax number is 023 8023 2459

The e-mail address is maib@dft.gsi.gov.uk

Safety Digests are available on the Internet: www.maib.gov.uk

The role of the MAIB is to contribute to safety at sea by determining the causes and circumstances of marine accidents, and working with others to reduce the likelihood of such causes and circumstances recurring in the future.

Extract from:

The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation)

Regulations 2005 The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these regulations is to determine its circumstances and the cause with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to apportion liability, nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to apportion blame.

Chief Inspector's Foreword

1 Man Overboard - Fatal Accident

2 Capsize - With Assistance

3 Quick, Sensible and Effective Action

4 Fisherman uses Rule 17 to Good Effect

5 Liferafts Do Save Lives

6 A Fatal Decision

7 Not a Stroll in the Park

8 Stability Aware?

9 Corrosion, What Corrosion?

10 It Just Went off in my Hand Chief!

11 Elevated Work, Elevated Risks

12 Two Fires, a Flood and a Foundering

13 Lulled Into a False Sense of Security

14 All Action and No Talk

15 Vessel Saved by a Plastic Bag?

16 Don't Ride the Fish Lifting Gear

17 Net Hauled, Only to Sink with the Vessel

18 Family Tragedy Averted

19 Alcohol and Lack of Sleep - a Lethal Cocktail

Contents Fishing Vessel Accident Statistics

Major Accident Locations Chart

MAIB Published Reports

Glossary

MAIB Report Request Form

Chief Inspector’s Fishing is, by a large margin,

In 2005, 34 UK fishing vessels were lost with the cost of 9 fishermen’s lives. These figures are depressingly consistent with previous years – at a time when safety is improving in virtually every other industry. Fishing is, by a large margin, the most dangerous profession in the UK.

There is a widely held view in the industry that: fishing has always been a dangerous business; it always will be; and there is nothing anyone can do about the dangers of the sea. THIS IS JUST NOT TRUE. Very few, if any, of the losses are caused by “the sea”. They are actually caused by human failures, such as: poor maintenance; leaving doors and hatches open; watchkeepers falling asleep or leaving the wheelhouse unmanned; ill considered modifications to the vessel making it unstable; dangerous practices when shooting or recovering nets, or after coming fast; or the lack of a lifejacket, liferaft or EPIRB.

It is worth a small investment of time and money to ensure you, your crew and your vessel remain safe:

Foreword the most dangerous profession in the UK.

MAINTENANCE CHECKS NETS ■ Test your bilge alarm before every trip. ■ Think through how you shoot and recover your nets, and how you deal with problems such as ■ Turn off your seacocks in harbour – it will coming fast. Look at the possible dangers, and prevent your vessel sinking in harbour, and how you can reduce them. ensure that they are working if you need them in an emergency at sea. LIFESAVING EQUIPMENT ■ Wear inflatable lifejackets on deck. Talk to ■ Check your bilge pumps work. Seafish or the RNLI to identify a suitable lifejacket that can be worn without getting in the ■ Regularly check your hull and hatches. way.

■ Check your fire-fighting equipment. ■ Keep other lifejackets accessible for emergencies – lifejackets stowed in a container DOORS AND HATCHES near the wheelhouse have saved lives, and ■ Close doors, hatches and windows as a matter could save yours. of routine – it’s much easier to keep water out than trying to pump it out. ■ Ensure you have an in-date liferaft, that it has a good hydrostatic release, and that it is well ■ Use all the dogs on doors and hatches; this will positioned to float free. help prevent them from seizing. ■ Fit an EPIRB. It can alert rescue services in the ■ Fit suitable ventilators rather than using doors event of your vessel sinking if you don’t have and windows for ventilation. time to put out a distress call or GMDSS alert.

MODIFICATIONS A little preparation can ensure that you and ■ Seek professional advice on the effect any your crew return home safely, whatever the sea modifications will have on your vessel’s stability. throws at you – you owe it to your loved ones.

WATCHKEEPING ■ Make sure a good lookout is kept at all times – never leave the wheelhouse unattended.

Man overboard

– fatal accident Narrative A 16m fishing vessel was returning the aft deck to finish their coffee aft was nowhere to be found. The to port after spending the day and cigarettes. The skipper was in remaining deck crew quickly fishing for crabs using creels. On the wheelhouse with the port side searched ashore, thinking he might board were the skipper and three window open. have jumped off the fishing vessel crew members; all three crew Two members of the crew for some reason. However, he was members were turned in. The proceeded forward and the other not found. weather conditions were good: a went to his station, port side aft. The skipper raised the alarm light south-easterly wind and slight The height of bulwarks aft was immediately with the emergency seas. significantly less than the required services, and a full air and sea When the vessel reached a minimum. search was conducted. The search position about a mile from the None of the crew were wearing continued for several hours without harbour entrance, all three deck working type lifejackets. None were success. A month later, the body of crew members were called to make on board. the missing crewman was found ready the vessel's moorings and When the vessel eventually washed ashore on a local beach. fenders. Before going to their came alongside in the harbour, the mooring stations, they gathered on crewman who had been stationed

The Lessons

1 This is another accident involving a fisherman losing his life after having fallen over the side. An exemption had permitted the vessel to operate with 2 Had the casualty been wearing a working type lifejacket or buoyancy aid, he might still have been alive to tell his tale. Always wear a working type bulwark heights aft well below the minimum required lifejacket or buoyancy aid in case it happens to you. No under the Code of Safe Working Practice for the matter how awkward or cumbersome they may seem, Construction and use of 15m Length Overall to Less they save lives. Than 24m Registered Length Fishing Vessels. Ironically, during the several years she had crabbed, creels had neither been hauled, nor shot over the stern. It is always easy to be wise after the event, but this tragic accident 3 If you haven’t already carried out a risk assessment, or been involved in one onboard your vessel, make sure you do. It is a handy tool for could so easily have been prevented if the height of the identifying the risks on board any fishing vessel. bulwarks aft had been increased using portable Dangers, such as low bulwark heights, will then become stanchions and wires. obvious.

Capsized - with Narrative A well found 7m GRP fishing vessel sailed from an east coast port with a crew of three to begin fishing in a river estuary. Onboard were the skipper, who was an experienced fisherman; a 14 year old boy, acting as deckhand; and a 9 year old boy, along for the trip as a passenger. Weather conditions were good. Shortly after leaving her mooring, the vessel started trawling for dover soles in approximately 7 metres of water in an area of known underwater obstructions. Fishing was good, and approximately 38 kilos of soles had been landed when the trawl came fast on what the skipper believed to be an underwater obstruction. Once fast, the skipper attempted to free the trawl by

Photographs taken during the salvage operation. The Lessons

1 All too often, the MAIB finds in its investigations that the wearing of lifejackets has been ignored; this case was no exception. The wearing of lifejackets 3 The coxswain of the lifeboat agreed to tow after a direct request from the skipper. Before starting the operation, it would have been prudent for the coxswain to have removed had not been considered at any time since the vessel left all crew from the vessel, or, at the very least, advised them of her mooring, even though two young people were the benefits of wearing lifejackets. It is also important for people onboard. Occasionally, lifejackets can be cumbersome involved in similar operations to have an awareness of the risks when handling fishing gear, however once this vessel involved in assisting vessels, especially fishing vessels that are was disabled it should have been evident to the skipper in danger of capsizing and possibly foundering. that lifejackets were a sensible precaution and could only have assisted with the rescue operation. 4 Analysis of the lessons learnt from this accident shows that a better awareness of the risks involved,

2 Fouling of the propeller effectively disabled the vessel. Earlier on, when the skipper had encountered little success freeing his nets, he should and a plan to minimise those risks, could quite easily have saved the vessel from foundering. Marine Guidance Note 265(F) clearly identifies some of the hazards associated have made the decision to slip and buoy the gear for with trawling, and explains in a straightforward manner recovery at a later date. This would have proved the some of the considerations to be taken into account in 8 safer AND more cost-effective option. order to minimise risks associated with such hazards.

assistance

alternate heaving on the port and The lifeboat subsequently arrived at overboard by the momentum, and starboard warps pulling the vessel the scene, the coxswain was the vessel came to rest on her towards the fastener against the briefed en-route by the skipper, who starboard side. After swimming, in prevailing tidal stream, at times was aware of the tenderness of his full working gear, to the stern of the submerging the gunwale. The vessel and specifically requested lifeboat, both crew members were skipper had not considered the the lifeboat not to tow him from assisted onboard by the lifeboat wearing of lifejackets for himself or forward. Consequently the lifeboat crew. A decision was then taken to his crew throughout the operation. secured alongside (bow to bow) cut the lines and allow the fishing Once the vessel was heaved back and secured 4 lines with the vessel to founder. The crew were and still fast, the skipper decided to intention of using minimum power transferred safely to the shore and turn her head into the tide and run to free the fishing vessel from the luckily on this occasion no one back over the fastener in a further fastener. Fortunately, it was decided suffered injury. attempt to free the gear. On to transfer the 9 year old boy A salvage operation performed completion of the turn, the dog rope across to the lifeboat for safety. the following day located the vessel from the cod end fouled the Shortly afterwards, the on its second attempt. After a 6 propeller and the vessel lost all coxswain applied minimum power hour operation, the trawls were cut manoeuvrability. in an attempt to free the vessel. and the vessel raised, pumped out Realising he now required Immediately power was applied, the and safely returned to her mooring. assistance, the skipper made a fishing vessel began capsizing to Divers were not able to identify the mobile telephone call to a friend, starboard, away from the lifeboat. nature of the obstruction due to who liaised with the local lifeboat. The skipper and crew were thrown poor visibility.

Quick, sensible and effective

3 action Damaged area above batteries.

Narrative The watchkeeper in the operated valves. A “Pan Pan” was wheelhouse of a 16 metre wooden broadcast and acknowledged by fishing vessel was alerted to a the coastguard. The liferaft was problem by the engine room fire prepared for launching but, in the alarm. A quick inspection found a event, was not required. small fire in the region of the Fortunately, a nearby fishing switchboard and batteries. It was vessel was in a position to respond immediately tackled using a and she soon came alongside the portable foam extinguisher. This casualty. A towline was secured appeared to put out the fire, but this and, mainly due to the large attended. They entered the engine was replaced by large quantities of quantities of foul smoke still being room and found no signs of fire, acrid smoke. generated, all crew of the casualty although there were still significant The engine room was transferred to this vessel. The good amounts of heat. Damage appeared immediately evacuated, the hatch weather conditions made this to be confined to a group of and fire flaps were closed, the operation straightforward. electrical switchboxes just above the engine was stopped and the fuel The casualty was towed to a battery bank. It was presumed that supply shut off using the remotely nearby port where the fire brigade an electrical fault started the fire.

The Lessons

1 Following their successful attempt to extinguish the fire, the crew made no attempts to remain in the engine room once acrid smoke began to be 2 The engine room fire alarm obviously worked as intended and alerted the crew to the problem before the fire had a chance to spread. This showed the generated. This was very sensible as the heat was in the value of properly functioning fire detection systems. region of the batteries, and much of this ‘smoke’ might have been fumes from the acid within the batteries and hot electrical insulation. Closing down the engine room contained this potentially dangerous atmosphere until the 3 When discovered, the fire was not very large. By tackling it in the very early stages, the crew limited the damage so they were not forced to abandon vessel was brought into port, where the specialist their vessel prematurely. resources of the fire brigade were available.

Fisherman

uses rule 17 to good effect Narrative A fishing vessel was returning to The fishing vessel skipper unmanned, the skipper then port on a westerly course. It was interpreted that a risk of collision stopped his vessel, and the cargo dark with good visibility. A cargo existed and became concerned that vessel passed ahead at a range of vessel was approaching on a north- the cargo vessel was taking no about 0.3 mile. westerly course and was expected action to keep out of the way. He The fishing vessel skipper to cross ahead of the fishing vessel indicated his concern on VHF radio, reported this incident to the MAIB, at a range of about 0.2 mile. Both but the cargo vessel’s OOW failed which enabled us to take it up with vessels were displaying normal to understand what he was saying the company concerned. It is worth steaming lights. and made no response. Believing reporting such incidents to us - we the cargo vessel’s bridge to be will take action as appropriate.

The Lessons

1 Rule 17 (a)(ii) of the Collision Regulations empowers a stand-on vessel to take avoiding action as soon as it becomes apparent that the give-way 3 Although a perceived collision was avoided by the actions of the stand-on vessel alone, the situation could have been avoided altogether had the vessel is not taking appropriate action in compliance with cargo vessel’s OOW taken early action in compliance the Rules. In this case, the fishing vessel’s skipper used with Rule 15. it to good effect in eliminating what he considered to be a risk of collision.

2 The skipper’s accent was such that the cargo vessel’s OOW failed to understand what he was saying, and highlights the potential danger in using VHF radio for collision avoidance. As shown in this case, the use of VHF radio is unnecessary provided that the Collision Regulations are strictly complied with.

Liferafts do

save lives Narrative A 20 year old open, under 10m The wind was force 4 to 5 on there was very little water in the wooden gill netter sailed out of port their port quarter and there was a bilges and all looked well. He